Who’s going to decide which errant borrowers are going to be allowed walk away from their debts?
Sunday, December 28th, 2008Colm Rapple
Irish Mail on Sunday, December 28th, 2008
No-one has yet put a firm figure on the number of borrowers who are going to have their loans restructured, reduced or written off by the banks over the coming year. Neither do we have a figure for the amount that will be written off. But we can be sure that many borrowers won’t be paying back their loans in full and those with the largest liabilities are likely to benefit the most.
Who’s going to make the decisions? Which borrowers are going to be let walk away from their debts? Will the Government representatives on the banks’ boards have an input? Is there a possibility of political interference in the decision making? Will it all be done behind closed doors?
Similar issues have been faced in the past, particularly in the mid-1980s when thousands of farmers, with the help of a dedicated IFA team, negotiated significant reductions in their bank liabilities. Their problems were partly the result of a property bubble, much as today. Farmers had been encouraged to expand on the back of the massive gains arising from EEC entry in 1973. But farm incomes plummeted after 1979.
The individual rescue packages were all negotiated behind closed doors and the affected farmers were ordered to keep their deals secret. That suited both the IFA and the banks. The process was never reported in the media at the time although some indication of the scale of the problem and the extent of the loan write-offs became evident from the published accounts of the then State owned ACC (Agricultural Credit Company). It 1985 it got an injunction preventing the publication of an internal report on the extent of its bad debts but it subsequently admitted that it had some £52 million (€66m) in non-performing loans, a very large sum in those days.
On thing very clear from Dáil debates and reports from that time is that ACC and private banks all came under great political pressure to reduce or write-off farmer loans. TD’s were expected to make suitable representations on behalf of constituents. The deals were clearly influenced by political pressure and the extent to which individual borrowers had the backing of pressure groups such as the IFA.
This time political pressure is likely to be even more persuasive, given the extent of the State’s current involvement in the banks. Politicians certainly have more power over the banking system than they ever had. Deals will be done with land speculators and developers covering the extent of any write-down of loan liabilities, the forced sale of assets, loan extensions and, perhaps, interest rate reductions.
As currently structured the bank recapitalisation plan doesn’t provide any mechanism through which the public interest can be taken into account in such deals. Yet the public interest is unlikely to coincide with either that of the banks or the borrowers. Nor it is likely to coincide with the interests advocated by politicians making representations on behalf of individual borrowers.
The conflicts of interest are likely to be most acute when decisions have to be made over the sale of assets. A fire sale of some property assets could present local authorities with a golden opportunity for increasing the stock of social housing but would not be in the interests of either the banks or the developers. On the other hand an orderly disposal of properties may not be possible given the competing interests of individual lending institutions.
There are no easy answers but the operation of a free bargaining process between lenders and defaulting borrowers is unlikely to yield the best result. There’s much to be said for the imposition of some central control over the management of bad banking debts. The idea of transferring this so called toxic debt into a nationalised Anglo Irish Bank seems worth considering.
There is certainly a need for more transparency. As yet we don’t even know the true extent of the bad debt problems. The banks’ published accounts are believed to underestimate their extent while the independent report, commissioned in recent months from Price Waterhouse Coopers, was never made public. But some estimates suggest that the figure could run into billions.
Whatever the figure, the banks are going to take a major hit. Thanks to the injection of fresh capital, they should be able to survive. The cost will be borne by the bank’s shareholders – the owners who gained in the good times and now have to carry the can. Their losses are already reflected in the value that new investors are currently putting on their shares.
With no bank failure in prospect, taxpayers are unlikely to suffer any direct cost, but everyone is suffering from the recession which has at least been deepened by our own domestic banking crisis.
Little of the cost has so far been borne by the executives who oversaw the imprudent extension of credit which left the banks exposed to the bad debts that they now face. They can rightly claim that while many were forecasting some slow-down in the Irish property boom, no-one expected a conjunction of world financial crisis and domestic slow-down. Had the U.S. sub-prime crisis never occurred, the chances are that the Irish property bubble would have deflated rather than burst. But it’s the job of bank executives to take account of the unexpected in their risk assessments. So bank shareholders have every right to hold their managers accountable. There’ll be some interesting annual general meetings in 2009.
But of more concern to the rest of us, are the specifics of how the banks’ bank debt problems are resolved.